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This study focuses on fees paid to auditors during a major accounting change associated with extra 
audit risk and work. Specifically, we analyse how a major accounting change from local GAAP to IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) affects the audit and non-audit fees paid to auditors. Prior 
research had evidenced that several auditee-specific properties are associated with audit fees. However, 
there is lack of specific knowledge on how a major accounting change affects audit and, especially, 
non-audit fees. Our sample comprises Finnish listed firms that adopted IFRS for the first-time. The Finn-
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ish data are employed since prior research findings suggest that there are large differences between 
Finnish accounting standards (FAS) and IFRS anticipating extra audit risk and work at the accounting 
move. Therefore, it is highly likely that extensive supply for audit and non-audit services during the 
transition from FAS to IFRS would occur. When taking into account several control variables, in line 
with prior research, our analyses based on unique, hand-collected data provide evidence that a com-
pany with a high FAS-IFRS disparity is associated with more costly non-audit services during the tran-
sition phase than one with low disparity. Furthermore, the results reveal that audit fees, where audit 
markets are more competitive, are not significantly related to the magnitude of IFRS adjustments. 
Overall, the research findings inform, among other things, audit firms and their clients about the type 
and the level of costs incurred during a major accounting change.
Keywords: audit supply, non-audit fees, audit fees, IFRS, transition
1. intrOductiOn
For many firms globalization of financial reporting has created a need to prepare their financial 
statements using the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB)1. Consequently, companies listed in the European Union (EU) 
are required by decision of the European Parliament and Council to prepare consolidated finan-
cial statements in accordance with IFRS for years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. For 
companies the adoption of new accounting standards is likely a huge step, especially if the local 
accounting standards differ significantly from the global standards. Under these circumstances 
the need for sufficient resources, training, dedication, communication and preparation by local 
authorities, managers and auditors is required. 
For auditors the complexity of the IFRS transition and the client’s potential insufficient prep-
arations can increase uncertainties and risks in their audit assignment. For example, Hoogendoorn 
(2006) has argued that companies have underestimated the complexities, effects and costs of IFRS 
(see also Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006). In EU countries there is also evidence of 
limited IFRS transition preparation (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004a; ICAEW 2004). Also, in Fin-
land the transition to IFRS has resulted in considerable costs for the firms audited and for the 
auditors themselves (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2003b, 62; KPMG 2006). For example, in 
order to enhance audit and assurance supply, KPMG Finland established a special IFRS audit team 
for their customers (KPMG 2009). Furthermore, compared to local GAAP, IFRS may allow for 
more judgement by management in deciding how they will comply with IFRS (Marden and 
1 In addition many other countries have required companies to adopt IFRS. According to Ball (2006), there are almost 
one hundred countries who have adopted them. Recently, SEC (2007) eliminated the requirement for foreign private 
issuers who submit financial statements in accordance with IFRS to reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. Further-
more, in 2008 the AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) voted to add the IASB to the approved 
list of accounting standards-setting bodies, effectively giving private companies the option to use IFRS. 
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Brackney 2009). Recent studies (Street, Gray and Bryant 1999; Street and Bryant 2000; Glaum 
and Street 2003) have documented significant noncompliance with the disclosure requirements 
of IFRS in many areas. Hodgdon et al. (2009) show that statutory audit plays an important role in 
compliance with IFRS. On the other hand, during major accounting changes auditing companies 
are usually the natural non-audit consultancy service provider for auditees (Patel et al. 2009). 
Major accounting changes, like the transition from local accounting standards to IFRS, create 
extra client risk and more time-consuming work for the auditor; both of which are likely to be 
reflected in audit (audit origin) and non-audit (consultation origin) fees. 
This paper looks into the fees paid to statutory auditors associated with the companies in 
Finland which implement IFRS for the first time. Recent guidelines by Corporate Governance 
Working Group (2004) enable us to hand-collect the audit and non-audit fee data in order to 
analyse the audit and non-audit production due to the transition of Finnish companies to IFRS. 
By focusing on small- and medium-sized listed firms in Finland we shed new insight onto this 
issue. The sample firms are first-time adopters; therefore it is likely that audit and non-audit fees 
are affected by the IFRS transition (i.e. so-called supply effect). So far this topic is a mainly unre-
solved research issue. Typically, non-audit services are positively associated with audit fees (e.g. 
Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986). Analyzing audit and non-audit fees is of interest when examining 
the cost structures of auditing companies, predicting future fees and investigating pricing policies. 
This information would be useful for auditing companies and their clients regarding the type, the 
level and the duration of costs incurred during a major accounting change. Although it is known 
that complexity and risk in general increase fees, how IFRS transition affects audit (audit origin) 
and non-audit (consultation origin) fees is mainly unknown. 
The Finnish data, along with certain background, provide a suitable platform for the study. 
Previous literature has documented that i) Finnish Accounting Standards (FAS) deviate from IAS 
(e.g. Kinnunen et al. 2000; Ding et al. 2007), and that ii) the FAS has uniquely national roots – the 
traditional bookkeeping model is based on the so-called expenditure-revenue theory (e.g. Räty 
1992; Kettunen 1993; Pirinen 2005). While the IFRS is characterised to be more principle-based, 
the FAS can be classified as rule-based, which according to Marden and Brackney (2009) may 
increase audit risk. Since the institutional setting of Finland resembles a typical Continental Eu-
ropean country with concentrated corporate ownership and code law oriented legal system, we 
suppose that the research findings correspondingly provide insights for other countries as well. 
This research is motivated by two gaps in the present literature. First, the extant literature 
related to IFRS implementation is heavily concentrated on stock market implications. In spite of 
the widespread adoption of IFRS, there has been much discussion and research questioning the 
relevance of IFRS (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia 2001; Leuz 2003; Tarca 2004; Hung and Subraman-
yam 2007; Horton and Serafeim 2008) and there is only a very limited amount of studies that 
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focus on other dimensions related to the transition. Second, of the audit fee studies, there are only 
a few which investigate how changes in regulatory and disclosure environments affect audit fees 
and non-audit fees. 
Taylor and Simon (1999) have shown that differences in regulatory and disclosure environ-
ments affect audit fee differences across countries, but changes in the regulatory and disclosure 
environment within a single country have rarely been addressed. This is natural since these large-
scale changes, such as switching from one set of accounting standards to another, seldom occur. 
Griffin and Lont (2007) have analyzed audit fees in the wake of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. 
Griffin et al. (2009) found that audit fees, but not non-audit fees, were associated with the transi-
tion of New Zealand to IFRS. On the contrary, auditor switches are more common, and there are 
empirical findings that switching costs are related to the legal liability environment (Kallunki, 
Sahlström and Zerni 2007). 
Thus, in order to better understand audit and non-audit fee formation during IFRS transition, 
more insight is needed to assess whether the complexity of the transition coincides with audit 
and non-audit fees. The results provide insights, among other things, into whether IFRS financial 
statements are more costly to audit than FAS financial statements, which would suggest that IFRS 
transition is associated with audit fees. On the other hand, if the incurred transition costs are 
mainly associated with non-audit fees rather than audit fees reflecting IFRS start-up and learning, 
the costs are temporal in nature and will decrease over time (Griffin et al. 2009).
This research has significant implications also for audit companies. Due to the widespread 
adoption of IFRS, auditors have been forced to evaluate how the transition to the new accounting 
standards affects the pricing of their services. This contributes to the auditor’s evaluation of how 
complex and time-consuming the actual preparing of the IFRS transition has been in Finland. It 
is supposed to be reflected in audit and non-audit fees. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We discuss audit fee determination based on 
prior theoretical and empirical research in section 2. Then, based on that discussion, we present 
two hypotheses. Section 3 displays the methodology applied with special care being given to the 
research tool applied to quantify the IFRS adjustments. The Finnish institutional setting is displayed 
together with the data in section 4. The results from the testing of the hypotheses are reported in 
section 5. A summary in section 6 concludes the paper.
2. audit and nOn-audit fee deterMinatiOn and HYPOtHeSeS
2.1 audit fee determination 
The economics model of audit pricing suggested by Simunic (1980) and many others (e.g. Simu-
nic and Stein 1996; for identification problem, see Pong and Whittington 1994) implies that an 
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auditor’s cost function is based on two related components: i) the costs of the audit effort, and ii) 
the expected cost of the auditor’s client-based business risk. The audit effort is needed in order to 
accumulate enough evidence concerning the quality of the financial statements given. Since the 
audit fee is the product of unit price and the quantity of audit services, a difference in audit fees 
can be due to quantity and/or the price component of the fee. Prior literature has indicated several 
variables that explain the level of audit fees: client size, operational complexity and various as-
pects of risks. Those variables and model for audit fees paid to statutory auditor will be detailed 
later in section 3.2.
2.2 non-audit fee determination
The provision of non-audit (consultation origin) services by auditing companies to their audit 
clients has been a worldwide phenomenon. Non-audit services include such themes as account-
ing assistance, accounting compilation, ad hoc accounting advice, due diligence, and tax consult-
ing. Decisions regarding these non-audit services are made by a firm’s operative management. A 
handbook published by International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) covers, among others, the 
code of ethics for professional accountants (IFAC 2008). One of the key themes in that handbook 
is auditor independence in general and independence e.g. in assurance services. The auditor 
should always be independent of the client. There have been concerns about how auditors’ sup-
ply of non-audit services potentially affects their independence (Levitt 2000). As suggested by 
Hay et al. (2006), a threat to independence can be the result if auditors reduce audit fees as a loss 
leader in order to obtain consulting work, which would imply a negative relationship between 
audit and non-audit services. 
Prior research has usually found a positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees. 
Simunic (1984), Palmrose (1986), DeBerg et al. (1991), Davis et al. (1993), and Firth (1997) have 
all documented a positive relation between audit and non-audit fees, while no relationship is 
found by Abdel-Khalik (1990), and O’Keefe, et al. (1994). Whisenant et al. (2003) and Hay et al. 
(2006) empirically document that audit fees and non-audit fees are simultaneously determined. 
If so, then the significant positive coefficient between audit fees and non-audit fees might be due 
to misspecification of the model. Whisenant et al. (2003) and Geiger and Rama (2003) evidence 
a positive relation between audit and non-audit fees using single-equation estimations. However, 
the relationship between the variables is not evidenced when simultaneous-equation analysis is 
employed, suggesting that audit fees and non-audit fees are jointly determined. Antle et al. (2006) 
extend the analyses by adding abnormal accruals into the analyses, since the strength of the 
economic bond between auditors and their clients may be positively related to the abnormal 
accruals suggested by e.g. Frankel et al. (2002).
Another body of research examines the implications of the provision of non-audit services 
16
LTA  1 /10  •  M .  V i e r u  A n d  H .  S c H A d e w i T z
on an auditor’s independence (Reynolds et al. 2004). Generally, the joint supply of these two 
services can cause positive and/or negative influences on auditing (Frankel et al. 2002). In some 
countries the provision of consultancy services to audit clients is either outlawed or is strongly 
discouraged2. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (H.R.3763, U.S. Congress 2002) restricts 
audit firms from providing certain kinds of management consulting services. 
2.3 Hypotheses
We posit that auditors assess their audit plan and the expected cost of client business risk in the 
given institutional and regulatory environments as suggested in the prior literature (Simunic 1980; 
Taylor and Simon 1999; Cobbin 2002). This means that auditor judgements will be influenced by 
the characteristics of the auditing environments and the client itself. If regulatory and disclosure 
environments change creating an impact upon audit pricing components, they should affect 
audit fees. We believe that not only audit fees but also non-audit fees are under consideration 
when regulatory and disclosure environments change3. Furthermore, we focus on two years: 
transition year (2004, the year prior to IFRS adoption) and first year of adoption (2005). Limiting 
our sample to new IFRS adopters and focusing on two years that are critical in IFRS adoption 
(transition year and adoption year) should inform us of how IFRS adoption is associated to audit 
and non-audit fees. In other words, our presumption is that the knowledge gap for implementing 
IFRS in small and medium-sized firms is likely to be substantial which, in turn, is reflected in 
audit and non-audit fees. Compared to large firms, small and medium-sized firms are less expe-
rienced with regard to various international issues in financial accounting e.g. due to their local 
operations and traditions4. 
The IFRS transition can be understood as a significant change in regulatory and disclosure 
environments for the auditor, especially in countries where large differences between domestic 
GAAP and IFRS exist. Based on previous literature (Kinnunen et al. 2000; Pirinen 2005; Ding et 
al. 2007), the transition from FAS to IFRS is considered to be a major accounting event which is 
assumed to affect audit and non-audit fees. Among others, IFRS calls for more judgment by man-
agement when deciding how they will comply with IFRS (Marden and Brackney 2009). Also the 
disclosure requirements of IFRS are much more detailed compared to FAS.
However, not only the increase in regulation and disclosure requirements but also the in-
crease in the complexity of the transition plus the possible lack of preparation (e.g. by Hoogen-
2 In Finland, the statutory auditor is allowed to consult with IFRS-related issues. This activity has also been common 
since IFRS-related consulting is often mentioned when information about origin of the non-audit fees have been 
provided. Other frequently mentioned activities are consultations related to corporate income taxation.
3 Mandatory transition should not cause major changes to firms’ reporting incentives. For example, Wu (2008) 
highlighted that in order to minimize the risk of biased conclusions reporting incentives should be as constant as 
possible. 
4 see e.g. Räty (1992), Salmi (1996), and Pirinen (2005). 
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doorn 2006; Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2003a) 
create extra risk and work for auditors. In the spirit of Palmrose (1986), companies may lack the 
suitable accounting and information technology to prepare financial statements that comply with 
the IFRS accounting requirements, which consequently may act as a signal for the auditor to 
change to a more intensive, more costly audit programme. Also, Ball (2006, 34) has pointed out 
that in the current IFRS enforcement system there has only been limited success fully implement-
ing the set of standards. Although there have been discussions claiming that the IFRS transition is 
not fully implemented in practice, from the beginning of the first IFRS financial statements there 
has also been discussion about the extra work load required5. Consequently, the more FAS and 
IFRS financial statement figures deviate from each other in transaction reconciliation reports, the 
higher the audit fees. Thus the hypothesis is:
H1: There is a positive relation between audit (audit origin) fees and the degree of IFRS 
adjustments.
Our second hypothesis is related to non-audit (consultation origin) fees. IFRS transition is a major 
accounting change and affects firms’ financial reports in several ways. Since financial statements 
are remarkably different (especially disclosure requirements) under the IFRS regime compared to 
the FAS regime, the IFRS regime calls for different preparatory work compared to the FAS regime. 
It could well be that especially this preparatory work requires a consultation type of auditor in-
volvement that, in turn, is reflected in non-audit fees. 
When the IFRS transition is considered as a major accounting event, it calls for preparation, 
learning and pre-reporting of its impact upon financial accounts (Committee of European Secu-
rities Regulators 2003a). In practise, auditors are usually the most natural IFRS advisors and 
consultants for a company (Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006). Indeed, in many an-
nual reports it is explicitly written, among other things, that part of the non-audit fees is based 
on IFRS transition consultation. Firth (2002) found that non-audit fees were associated with a 
lower incidence of audit qualifications or modifications. Sharma and Sidhu (2001), however, 
concluded that large non-audit fees to total fees undermine auditor independence when auditors 
have a tendency to not issue a going concern qualification to clients. Second, a lack of compe-
tition in the IFRS transition market for non-audit services can result in a positive relationship 
between audit and non-audit fees (Solomon 1990). If there are only few IFRS specialists avai-
lable, and the common understanding within companies about the IFRS transition requirements 
is poor (Jermakowitz and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006), it is tempting to charge extra fees from the 
5 Pricing effect is also associated with the competition in audit market. Our discussions with Finnish authorised 
public accountant professionals (Fredriksson 2009; Pajamo 2009) support the view that the competition in Finnish 
auditing markets was hard during 2003–2006 which may decrease pricing consequences.
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clients6. Consequently, the more FAS and IFRS financial statement figures deviate from each 
other in transaction reconciliation reports, the greater the difference in non-audit fees. Thus the 
second hypothesis is:
H2: There is a positive relation between non-audit (consultation origin) fees and the degree 
of IFRS adjustments.
In the empirical part of the study the hypotheses are tested. The tests provide insights into whether 
auditors experience the IFRS transition as a costly affair. On the other hand, if non-audit fees (but 
not audit fees) are associated with the deviation between FAS and IFRS in transaction reconcili-
ation reports, in line with Griffin et al. (2009) it suggests IFRS start-up and learning costs are 
temporal in nature and transition-specific costs are likely to decrease over time. 
In the following section we present our research methodology. First, we demonstrate the 
magnitude of the IFRS adjustments using the analyses of comparability. Second, we provide a 
model to study whether the amount of IFRS adjustments is actually related to an increase in audit 
and non-audit fees.
3. MetHOdOLOGY
In this section we introduce a measure for the magnitude of IFRS adjustments using analyses of 
comparability. This measure is needed in order to recognise and classify material disparity be-
tween FAS and IFRS in a structured way. Secondly, we present regression models for audit and 
non-audit fees which control and take into account several variables frequently employed in prior 
research.
3.1 Magnitude and nature of ifrS adjustments
In previous studies the degree of accounting adjustments between the two accounting standards 
has been measured using an analysis of comparability. The index of comparability (CI) has been 
frequently used to identify and quantify accounting adjustments (e.g. Ucieda Blanco and García 
Osma 2004; Street et al. 2000; Adams et al. 1999). In this study, the magnitude of IFRS adjust-
ments is based on an index of comparability calculated using four indicator variables: two of them 
are based on an income statement and the other two on a balance sheet. One of the benefits of 
our focus is that the items and their contents are specifically defined for each firm individually. 
Our measures are also important economic indicators of the firms’ performance and their financ-
ing for investors and other stakeholders (Penman 2001). The correctness of the selected items, in 
6 According the practising APA professional (Pajamo 2009), the audit firms were proactive during the IFRS transition 
and adoption time in order to inform their current and potential clients about the IFRS services available. 
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turn, is an important issue also for auditors. Differences between FAS and IFRS-based income 
statement and balance sheet variables might be reflected also in disclosures. We acknowledge 
that our measure of comparability does not directly capture potential differences in disclosures 
between FAS and IFRS. We will discuss this issue further in section 5 (Results).
Indicator variables based on an income statement are: i) earnings before interests and taxes, 
EBIT (Eq. (1)), and ii) net income, NI (Eq. (2)). They are constructed in the following way:
(1)  
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Eq. (1) measures the cumulative IFRS adjustments for the underlying company presented in 
reconciliations of the income statement down to the EBIT level scaled by book value of equity. The 
numerator consists of the IFRS adjustments related e.g. to revenue recognition, share-based payments, 
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goodwill and other asset impairments. Positive (or negative) difference indicates that the IFRS 
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cumulative IFRS adjustments between the EBIT level and the NI level of the income statement scaled 
by book value of equity. In order to avoid counting IFRS adjustments in the income statement twice, 
Eq. (2) is constructed so that the IFRS adjustments in EBIT (in Eq. 1) are subtracted. The numerator 
consists of the IFRS adjustments related e.g. to financial instruments and deferred taxes.  
The indicator variables based on the balance sheet are equity capital, EQ (Eq. (3)) and total debt, 
DEBT (Eq. (4)). Eq. (3) measures the cumulative IFRS adjustments for the underlying company 
presented in reconciliation of the book equity (EQ) scaled by book value of equity. The numerator 
consists of the IFRS adjustments related to e.g. profit from current and previous years, changes in 
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The use of equity capital is unlikely to cause problems related to small and unstable denominators 
(see e.g. Ucieda Blanco and García Osma 2004; Rees 1995, 94). The comparability score metric is 
constructed from two income statement-based indicator variables and from two balance sheet-based 
indicator variables ( EBITCI , NICI , EQCI , and DEBTCI ) presented above. Since it is assumed that the 
IFRS adjustments per se are relevant for fees paid to the statutory auditor, absolute values are thus 
used assuming that both negative and positive adjustments have equal consequences for fees. The 
sample firms are classified into IFRS adjustments deciles based on each indicator variable. Each 
decile classification ( EBITDCI , NIDCI , EQDCI , and DEBTDCI ) takes on a value of zero for the smallest 
decile and nine for the largest.
An aggregated measure of comparability is achieved when the decile classification values for a single 
company are added together. This procedure returns a maximum value of 36 for companies in which 
IFRS adjustments have scored in the highest decile (i.e. four times nine) in each IFRS adjustment 
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revaluation reserves, pension liabilities, and costs related to stock issues. Positive (or negative) 
difference indicates that the IFRS adjustments as a whole have increased (decreased) book equity,
EQ. Eq. (4) measures the cumulative IFRS adjustments on liabilities (DEBT) scaled by book value of 
equity. The numerator consists of the IFRS adjustments related e.g. tax liabilities, pension liabilities, 
and liabilities related to lease agreements. These indicator variables are calculated in the following 
way:
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The constructed adjustments comparability score (ADJ) for a company having the lowest IFRS 
adjustments for an income statement and balance sheet is zero, whereas a company having the largest 
IFRS adjustments ADJ is one. The use of a constructed comparability score metric has certain 
advantages over the original variables. Firstly, it aggregates the IFRS adjustments from four different 
financial statement levels to a single variable. Auditing theory does not inform us how each separate 
CI affects audit and non-audit fees. Despite that some information is lost after aggregating separate 
DCIs into ADJ, the aggregation may, on the other hand, reduce noise. Secondly, the use of scaled 
decile ranks instead of the original variables provides an efficient tool for taking care of possible 
outliers associated with extreme values. The implicit assumption is that each indicator variable (DCIs)
has an equal and additive effect on fees paid to the statutory auditor. We are aware that this 
assumption simplifies the setting since audit risk and audit effort related to IFRS adjustments on 
income statement and balance sheet items may vary. For example, some IFRS adjustments can be 
classified for routine adjustments and some adjustments need extra work and judgement. We will 
come back to this issue in our robustness analyses in section 5.3.2. 
In order to gain additional insight (Corbin and Strauss 2008) and supplement the methods above 
regarding audit and non-audit fees in the Finnish context, we also performed two interviews with two 
professional Authorized Public Accountants (APAs) (Fredriksson 2009; Pajamo 2009). The interview 
with APA Fredriksson was a theme interview focusing on audit and non-audit fee levels, their 
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certain advantages over the original variables. Firstly, it aggregates the IFRS adjustments from four 
different financial statement levels to a single variable. Auditing theory does not inform us how 
each separate CI affects audit and non-audit fees. Despite that some information is lost after ag-
gregating separate DCIs into ADJ, the aggregation may, on the other hand, reduce noise. Secondly, 
the use of scaled decile ranks instead of the original variables provides an efficient tool for taking 
care of possible outliers associated with extreme values. The implicit assumption is that each 
indicator variable (DCIs) has an equal and additive effect on fees paid to the statutory auditor. We 
are aware that this assumption simplifies the setting since audit risk and audit effort related to 
IFRS adjustments on income statement and balance sheet items may vary. For example, some IFRS 
adjustments can be classified for routine adjustments and some adjustments need extra work and 
judgement. We will come back to this issue in our robustness analyses in section 5.3.2.
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In order to gain additional insight (Corbin and Strauss 2008) and supplement the methods 
above regarding audit and non-audit fees in the Finnish context, we also performed two interviews 
with two professional Authorized Public Accountants (APAs) (Fredriksson 2009; Pajamo 2009). 
The interview with APA Fredriksson was a theme interview focusing on audit and non-audit fee 
levels, their development, and their potential interaction in Finland. Afterwards APA Fredriksson 
supplied some additional information regarding the topic under discussion. The interview with 
APA Pajamo was semi-structured; more than two weeks before the interview we sent the whole 
manuscript (version 16 Sep 2009) and the cover letter to him. In the cover letter we summarize 
the major findings in the paper and stated a few questions based on those results and the interview 
with APA Fredriksson. We also proposed a few general questions regarding professional audit 
issues, such as the role of IFAC recommendations in Finnish audit practises. The agenda in the 
interview with APA Pajamo was as follows: First we handled six broader issues related to the 
paper, also covering the questions in the cover letter. Second we went through the paper itself 
and discussed some of its details. The interviewer made notes throughout the session. It should 
be noted here that both of the interviewees have read this paper and accepted the presented in-
formation based on these interviews. The opinions presented in the interviews are the interview-
ees’ own personal opinions and do not necessarily represent the views of their employers.
3.2 Models for audit and non-audit fees paid to the statutory auditor
Here we derive models for audit and non-audit fees paid to the statutory auditor in order to ana-
lyse whether the IFRS adjustments (measured by ADJ) are related to those fees (Eqs (6) and (7) 
below). As noted by Whisenant et al. (2003), it is possible to estimate these two equations sepa-
rately using a single-equation estimation technique if audit and non-audit fees are determined 
independently.7 In line with prior literature, detailed below, several control variables for client 
size, operational complexity and various aspects of risks are also included in the models. 
Previous studies have frequently indicated that the most important variable in explaining the 
level of audit fees is the size of the auditee. In these studies the company size is assumed to be 
related to the need for more time, resources and effort in preparing, analyzing and testing the 
company information before the issuance of audit opinion (e.g. Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; 
Davis et al. 1993; Bell et al. 2001; Chung and Narasimhan 2002; Cobbin 2002). In Cobbin’s 
(2002) survey of auditing literature, the size variable is always reported as a significant and 
positive determinant of audit fees. The natural logarithm of total assets is frequently used since, 
for example, economies of scale reduce audit work. Also, it is likely that non-audit services are 
higher for large-sized companies. Our measure for size is the logarithm of total assets ln(SIZE).
7 However, eqs (6) and (7) capture relations imperfectly if these two dependent variables are simultaneously deter-
mined. In section 5.3.2. simultaneous-equation considerations of the models are discussed.
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Also, the complexity of the auditee increases the need to spend time and conduct larger and 
deeper testing procedures and analyses. There are country-specific differences in the level of fi-
nancial accounting information disclosure (Hope 2003). Since the auditor has to examine and 
become familiar with both financial reporting systems and financial disclosures, it is reasonable 
to expect that more fees are required due to extensive reporting (i.e. high complexity). 
The results of many earlier studies support the idea that the client’s operational complexity 
is a significant variable in determining the level of audit fees (Simunic 1980; Niemi 2002; 
Whisenant et al. 2003; Nikkinen and Sahlström 2005; Joshi and Al-Bastaki 2000) and non-audit 
fees (Palmrose 1986; Solomon 1990; Whisenant et al. 2003). The complexity can be related to 
asset structure and business operations. Simunic (1980) and Francis and Simon (1987) suggest 
that receivables and inventories require subjective judgement and consume more time in deter-
mining their values and, accordingly, are difficult and risky to audit. Complexity increases also if 
the company has numerous subsidiaries and other entities within the group (Simunic 1980). The 
location of subsidiaries can also make a difference. Multinationals with more detailed reporting 
and added complexity require increased audit effort because of the greater need for corporate 
governance and differences in accounting standards and practises. Ezzamel et al. (1996) and 
Niemi (2005), among others, have hypothesised and evidenced that audit fees are affected by 
foreign location of subsidiaries. We control operational complexity by employing two commonly 
used variables: i) the ratio of the sum of inventories and accounts receivable to total assets 
(INvrEC), and ii) the square root of the number of subsidiaries (SQ(SUBS)).
The risk component is related to the auditor’s potential future loss due to the possibility of 
e.g. litigation or a client’s failure. Audit risk can be defined as the risk that financial statements 
may be materially misstated after the audit is completed and an unqualified opinion be issued 
(Arens and Loebbecke 1994). Audit effort and audit risk are related since auditors address some 
forms of business risk by increasing audit effort, which in turn causes higher audit fees (e.g. Pratt 
and Stice 1994; Bell et al. 2001). This implies that the higher the anticipated audit risk the more 
numerous the audit tests perceived as necessary. In addition, a higher fee is required to compen-
sate for the greater anticipated risk of audit failure. Audit risk is also an important element in 
determining the level of audit fees (e.g. Simunic and Stein 1996; Pratt and Stice 1994; Bell et al. 
2001). Risk can arise in different ways (see e.g. Firth 1997, 513). Poor profitability and growth 
opportunities (e.g. Whisenant et al. 2003; Nikkinen and Sahlström 2005) can be related to risk. 
Our measure for profitability is rOE. We measure growth opportunities by the ratio of market 
value to book value of equity (MB). 
Also, the following risk categories can affect audit fees: market risk (e.g. Nikkinen and Sa-
hlström 2005), financial risk (e.g. Bell et al. 2001; Niemi 2002) and liquidity risk (e.g. Nikkinen 
and Sahlström 2005; Camaran 2005). Br is our market risk variable measured by equity beta. It 
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is estimated by Sharpe’s (1964) market model using daily stock and OMX25 index returns over a 
one-year period before the end of the fiscal year. Our financial risk variable is FLEv computed as 
the debt to equity ratio. We measure liquidity risk by quick ratio Qr (ratio of current assets less 
inventories to current liabilities). 
Finally, systematic differences in audit fees may exist among the different audit firms. E.g. 
Moizer (1997) reported that Price Waterhouse charges higher fees in many countries. In line with 
Niemi (2005), to control the possible pricing or effort differences between PricewaterhouseCoo-
pers (PwC) and the other audit firms, an indicator variable (PWC) was added to the audit model. 
In audit research PwC is normally not singled out, but what is contrasted is Big Four versus non-
Big Four audit firms. In the sample, however, there are hardly any non-Big Four audit firms, 
motivating the PWC dummy instead of indicator variables for Big Four audit firms. 
The magnitude of the IFRS adjustments comparability score (ADJ) is the variable of interest 
in the following cross-sectional regression model for audit fees:
(6)  
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If the regression results are consistent with the first hypothesis, then they would produce a positive 
and statistically significant parameter value for 2a  in the regression model (6). 
To examine the second hypothesis, we constructed a non-audit fee (NAU) model with control 
variables for client size, operational complexity and various aspects of risk. Regarding new financing, 
it is possible that new equity or debt issues can affect the non-audit fees (e.g. Whisenant et al. 2003). 
Therefore we add a variable indicating whether the company has issued equity or long-term debt in 
either the current year or subsequent fiscal year. Again, the magnitude of the IFRS adjustments 
comparability score, ADJ, the variable of interest in the following cross-sectional regression model: 
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The other independent variables are the same as in model (6) except that the non-audit fee variable is 
replaced by an audit fee variable and the last indicatory variable is replaced by a new finance indicator 
variable DISSUE. DISSUE receives value one if the company has issued equity or long-term debt in 
either the current year or subsequent fiscal year (zero otherwise). If the regression results are 
consistent with the second hypothesis, they would produce a positive and statistically significant 
parameter value for 2b  in the regression model (7).  
4. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
4.1 The auditing and enforcement of IFRS financial statements in Finland  
For the time being, the enforcement of the IFRS financial statements in the EU relies heavily on 
external auditors and national enforcement systems (Haller 2002, 178). In Finland, during the sample 
years, auditing was stipulated in the Auditing Act (936/28.10.1994) which became valid when Finland 
joined the EU in the beginning of 1995. As a member state of the EU, Finland has the obligation to 
ensure that the Finnish auditing regulations comply with the Directives of the European Commission. 
The Auditing Act defines the purpose and the scope of auditing. AU fees comprise fees due to 
statutory audit.8
Statutory audit covers an examination of the accounting records, financial statements, the report of the 
8 The auditor (incumbent auditor nominated by the General Meeting) presents the audit report to listed firm’s shareholders 
at the General Meeting. According the Companies Act (Chapter 6: Management and representation of the company, 
Section 2: General duties of the Board of Directors, Airaksinen et al. 2007) The Board of Directors is responsible, among 
other things, for the appropriate arrangements of the control of the company’s accounts and finance. This duty, amongst 
other responsibilities of the Board, is audited by the statutory auditor of the company.  
The other independent variables are the same as in model (6) except that the on-audit fee 
variable is replaced by an audit fee variable and the last indicatory variable is replaced by a new 
finance indicator variable DISSUE. DISSUE receives value one if the company has issued equity 
or long-term debt in either the current year or subsequent fiscal year (zero otherwise). If the re-
gression results are consistent with the second hypothesis, they would produce a positive and 
statistically significant parameter value for b2 in the regression model (7). 
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4. tHe inStitutiOnaL fraMewOrk and data
4.1 the auditing and enforcement of ifrS financial statements in finland 
For the time being, the enforcement of the IFRS financial statements in the EU relies heavily on 
external auditors and national enforcement systems (Haller 2002, 178). In Finland, during the 
sample years, auditing was stipulated in the Auditing Act (936/28.10.1994) which became valid 
when Finland joined the EU in the beginning of 1995. As a member state of the EU, Finland has 
the obligation to ensure that the Finnish auditing regulations comply with the Directives of the 
European Commission. The Auditing Act defines the purpose and the scope of auditing. AU fees 
comprise fees due to statutory audit.8
Statutory audit covers an examination of the accounting records, financial statements, the 
report of the Board of Directors, and also the administration of the client corporation (Section 
17). As part of the EU and internationalization, changes were made to the Audit Act in 2007 
(459/2007). For example, an auditor is no longer required by law to provide an opinion on the 
board of directors and managing director discharge from liability or the suggested profit distribu-
tion. However, the auditor must report on these two areas if the audit work suggests that a 
qualified audit opinion should be issued. Furthermore, a company (Annual General Meeting, the 
Board of Directors) can request such an opinion, and the auditor is authorized to supply that 
opinion.
Audits of parent companies in Finland also cover consolidated financial statements. The 
audits result in a statement of whether Members of the Board of Directors and the Managing 
Director can be discharged from liability for the financial period audited by the auditor. Accord-
ing to the Act in force during our research period 2004–2005 (Section 19), auditors must also give 
an opinion on: i) whether the audited financial statements comply with the prevailing legislation 
and generally accepted accounting practises, ii) whether the financial statements give a true and 
fair view of the clients performance and financial position, and iii) whether the use of profit and 
the distribution of other unrestricted equity is in compliance with the Limited Liability Companies 
Act. In addition of the Auditing Act, certified auditors must also follow the recommendations of 
the Finnish Institute of Authorized Public Accountants (these recommendations are consistent 
with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA)). This was the situation also during our research 
period 2004–2005. A recently published Finnish translation of ISA provides even more detailed 
guidance for audits. Finland has a two-tier system of certification of public accountants. For all 
8 The auditor (incumbent auditor nominated by the General Meeting) presents the audit report to listed firm’s share-
holders at the General Meeting. According the Companies Act (Chapter 6: Management and representation of the 
company, Section 2: General duties of the Board of Directors, Airaksinen et al. 2007) The Board of Directors is re-
sponsible, among other things, for the appropriate arrangements of the control of the company’s accounts and finance. 
This duty, amongst other responsibilities of the Board, is audited by the statutory auditor of the company. 
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listed companies, as well as the largest companies, the Auditing Act (Section 12) requires “first-
tier” auditors approved by the Central Chamber of Commerce (Authorized Public Accountant, 
APA) in its certification exam. 
The auditor’s liability is defined in the Auditing Act (Section 44). In addition to the client 
losses arising from negligent performance by the auditor in an audit, the auditor may also be held 
responsible for losses suffered by third parties when the auditor has failed to follow the prevailing 
laws (e.g. Accounting Act, Company Law and Audit Act) or company by-laws (Finnish Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (Finnish GAAS) provided by the Finnish Institute of Authorised 
Public Accountants). Niemi (2002, 40; 2005, 307) has pointed out several features in the legal 
system which mitigate auditor litigation to clients and third parties. For example, legal awards are 
limited to the plaintiff’s actual loss, thus being without punitive aspect. Also, class actions lawsuits 
are not possible. On the other hand, in Finland there is no upper limit for compensation for dam-
ages. Therefore audit risk insurance is especially useful in Finland. 
In Finland the Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-FSA) carries total responsibility for the 
overall IFRS supervision they oversee (comprising chiefly of listed companies, insurance compa-
nies, and financial institutions). Auditors have a responsibility to the shareholders of the firms they 
audit. FIN-FSA supervision covers all companies that are liable to comply with the IFRS. Only 
companies which are required to adhere to the IFRS standards fall within the scope of the super-
vision. The IAS Supervision Working Group (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2003a) has described 
the IFRS enforcement system (in Finnish). The material to be checked is based on random sam-
pling. For other companies the external control remains with a statutory auditor. The FIN-FSA’s 
IFRS supervision covers documents subject to the regular reporting obligations in accordance 
with securities market legislation. In addition, the FIN-FSA can ask for an opinion from the Finn-
ish Accounting Board on the application of the IFRS. If misstatements are found, appropriate 
actions are required. The most important action is the right to require a correction in which case 
the supervisor demands a company make public a defect or demands a restatement of financial 
information. Regardless of a Finnish Financial Supervision Authority’s (2005) report concerning 
the differences in the quality of IFRS financial statements, restatements have not been recorded 
during the sample years. In FIN-FSA’s investigation of an IFRS transition a public reprimand or a 
public warning can also be used. For uniform enforcement FIN-FSA co-operates with CESR (Com-
mittee of European Securities Regulators 2003b). 
4.2 the transition from faS to ifrS
A company preparing its first IFRS financial statements for 31 December 2005 has an adoption 
date of 1 January 2005 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004b). The transition date to IFRS for this 
company is 1 January 2004. IFRS 1 requires companies retrospectively implement and publish 
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their 2004 annual financial statements according to the IFRS standards. Companies are also re-
quired to report comparison figures, according to the FAS, as an analysis of the differences be-
tween the IFRS and FAS figures. Accordingly, listed Finnish companies are required to provide 
their unaudited reviews in order to assess the preliminary main impacts of the transition to IFRS. 
These reviews are based on the financial information for 2004, which was originally reported 
according to FAS. Thus, due to transition standard IFRS 1, the transition period has unique features 
which are in part relics from the FAS past. 
Because the transition from one accounting standard to another is a demanding and com-
plicated issue, it should be well communicated to the firms’ various stakeholders.9 Follow-up 
reports have shown that the quality of IFRS transition communication, as well as the quality of 
the IFRS financial statements for 2005, varied among the recent IFRS first-time adopters. Accord-
ing to the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (2005), two-thirds of the companies on the main 
list of the Helsinki Stock Exchange handled their IFRS transition communication well, but the 
communication of most of the I-list companies was rated as weak. Schadewitz and Vieru (2006) 
show that the IFRS communication before the transition in Finland was mostly narrative and that 
quantitative information was scantly provided. However, Miihkinen (2008) discovered that au-
thoritative disclosure recommendations had a robust effect on improving the firms’ reporting 
during IFRS transition in Finland. 
In addition, according to the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (2006), the quality of 
the listed companies’ 2005 IFRS financial statements varied. FIN-FSA concluded that some finan-
cial statements were properly prepared, but many financial reports of lower quality were also 
encountered and still needed developing. Also, in KPMG’s (2006, 4) report it is admitted that the 
estimates and adjustments produced were more rough than usual for Finland, resulting in the 
need for further improvement work to be done in the following years. These kinds of findings 
related to Nobes’s (2006) and Alexander’s (2006) critique concerning the common interpretations 
and applications of IFRS also create challenges for the auditors’ work. Furthermore, there are 
various adjustments that firms need to execute when switching their reporting to be in line with 
the IFRS (see e.g. KPMG 2002; 2003). Overall, these findings suggest that in Finland the transition 
to IFRS is a significant project for listed firms fuelling especially an increased advisory (NAU) 
supply. 
CESR (Committee of European Securities Regulators 2003a) has prepared recommendations 
for listed companies which concern providing markets with appropriate and useful information 
during the transition phase. This information is crucial, especially when, as in Finland, the local 
9 During the transition and adoption period 2004–2006 the development of IFRS standards has been somewhat 
frozen by IABS on purpose in order to support the transition and adoption of IFRS. Since 2007 the development of 
standards has been again vivid.
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GAAP deviates greatly from the IFRS. CESR (2003a) recommends (in para. 22) that as soon as a 
company can quantify the impact of the change resulting from IFRS on its financial statements, 
in a sufficiently reliable manner, it should be encouraged to disclose the relevant quantified in-
formation. Potential shortcomings in this transition period of communication could create severe 
information asymmetry problems for investors and other stakeholders concerning the proper 
analysis of companies and, in turn, could cause capital misallocations and other biased deci-
sions. 
4.3 the sample
The hypotheses are tested using data from Finland. The fee variables (audit fees paid to statutory 
auditor, AU, and non-audit fees paid to statutory auditor, NAU) are based on the companies’ an-
nual reports. The adjustments comparability score (ADJ) is based on IFRS adjustments found from 
the companies’ transition reconciliation reports available on OMHEX’s homepage (http://www.
omxgroup.com). Other variables used are based on the information available in the Thomson 
Financial database and the firms’ annual reports. The sample size was decreased for several rea-
sons (see table 1 below). Firstly, there were thirteen early IFRS adopters. Secondly, there are ten 
firms which are excluded from the sample due to large restructuring activities (e.g. mergers, spin-
offs, carve-outs), a recent listing, or the fact that the company belongs to the financial services or 
insurance industry. Restructuring activities and IPOs cause short and heterogeneous financial time 
series. Banks, financial services and insurance companies are excluded since the structure of their 
financial statement information differs considerably from other firms. The IFRS adjustments are 
collected from the reconciliations of the sample firms. The reconciliation for profit and loss state-
ments covers the fiscal year that ends during year 2004 and reconciliations of equity are based 
on the corresponding closing balance sheets. 
According to corporate governance recommendation (Corporate Governance Working Group 
2004) No. 54, Finnish listed companies shall report the fees of the external audi tor during the 
financial year. If the external auditor has been paid fees for non-audit services, such fees shall be 
Table 1. Sample selection.
Listed companies 133 100.00 %
 early ifrS adopters 13 9.77 %
recent ifrS adopters 120 90.23 %
 excluded for various reasons (e.g. restructuring, iPO, industry) 10 7.52 %
 Missing audit or non-audit fee data 26 19.55 %
 Missing observations in datastream 11 8.27 %
final Sample 73 54.89 %
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reported separately. Usually, companies have provided both audit fees and non-audit fees. Fees 
were incompletely reported by 26 firms, and for 11 companies the requested information is not 
available in the Thomson Financial database. Thus, the final sample consists of 73 firms that have 
a complete set of the information requested. The selection process is described in Table 1. Since 
the data are based on the years 2004 and 2005, the number of firm-years is 146. After our research 
period, there have been further specifications for non-audit fees in the Finnish Accounting Statute. 
Accordingly, non-audit fees for tax advisory, audit-related advisory, and other advisory services 
should be reported separately. Also statutory audit fees should be reported separately as was the 
case in our research period.
5. reSuLtS
5.1 the descriptive statistics of the ifrS adjustments
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the index of comparability (CI) for earnings before inter-
est and taxes (CIEBIT), net income (CINI), equity capital (CIEQ) and total debt (CIDEBT). The descriptive 
statistics show that EBIT calculated according to IFRS is on average higher compared to EBIT 
calculated according to FAS. This is indicated by the mean value for the index of comparability 
which results in a positive value (0.039). Also, the debt-to-equity ratio is on average higher (0.084) 
when calculated according to IFRS rather than FAS. For other indicators the average effects of 
accounting standards are minor.
Table 2. The descriptive statistics of the index of comparability measures.
Variable n Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
CIebIT 73 0.039 0.137 –0.565 0.007 0.027 0.045 0.673
CINI 73 0.004 0.078 –0.123 –0.010 –0.002  0.005 0.605
CIeQ 73 –0.011  0.104 –0.342 –0.048 0.000 0.036 0.276
CIDebT 73 0.084 0.166 –0.217 0.007 0.042 0.118 1.038
note: the index of comparability (ci) for indicator variables was calculated according to eqs (1)-(4). (see 
section 3.1.).
Table 3 shows the number of material and non-material adjustments for each indicator 
variable. We have set the materiality threshold in two different bands: a 0.05 band and a 0.10 
band. If the index of comparability is between –0.05 and 0.05, we classify the adjustment as 
having no material impact on our indicator variables; we consider it material otherwise. Likewise, 
when we set the threshold at 0.10, all adjustments with an index of comparability equal to or 
lower than –0.10 and larger or equal to 0.10 are considered material, and non-material otherwise. 
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This is a methodology previously used e.g. by Street et al. (2000) and Ucieda Blanco and García 
Osma (2004).
Table 3 suggests that material adjustments seem to be quite frequent on balance sheet vari-
ables (measured by CIEQ and CIDEBT, see Eq. 3 and 4), whereas in the income statement variables 
(measured by CIEBIT and CINI, see Eq. 1 and 2) a somewhat lower frequency was reconciled. Usu-
ally, the adjustments to EBIT are positive, whereas the IFRS adjustments in reconciliations between 
NI and EBIT (measured by CINI, see Eq. 2) are quite equally distributed. Material adjustments on 
debt usually have a positive sign (i.e. more debt). The number of positive adjustments is 32 and 
the number of negative adjustments is 4. The number of material adjustments on equity is quite 
balanced, 15 being positive and 18 negative. The analysis indicates also that 55% of companies 
(40 of 73) have had non-material adjustments in equity capital. Ucieda Blanco and García Osma 
(2004) reported equity capital adjustments related to Form 20-F reconciliations (p. 20). Com-
parison of the findings reveals that, in this study, the cases with non-material IFRS adjustments to 
equity capital between FAS and IFRS are more infrequent than the corresponding US GAAP ad-
justments (being 76%, based on the last row from Table 6 in the Ucieda Blanco and García Osma 
(2004) study) between IAS and US GAAP. 10
5.2 the descriptive statistics of the regression variables
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression models. Overall, 
these statistics show a typical picture of a highly skewed data set for the size-related variables, 
10 In the Ucieda Blanco and Garcia Osma (2004) study only net income and equity capital effects are reported. 
Due to the denominators’ differences net income changes are not compared.
Table 3. The frequency and proportion distributions of the index of comparability measures (N = 73).
 indicator variable
 frequency (#) Proportion (%)
index value CIebIT CINI CIeQ CIDebT CIebIT CINI CIeQ CIDebT
≤ –0.10 2 1 9 4 3 % 1 % 12 % 5 %
–0.099 − –0.050 0 4 9 0 0 % 5 % 12 % 0 %
–0.049 − 0.049 53 64 40 37 73 % 88 % 55 % 51 %
0.050 − 0.099 12 2 11 12 16 % 3 % 15 % 16 %
≥ 0.10 6 2 4 20 8 % 3 % 5 % 27 %
range:        
Highest value 0.67 0.61 0.27 1.04    
Lowest value –0.56 –0.12 –0.34 –0.22    
note: the index of comparability (CI) for indicator variables was calculated according to eqs (1)–(4).
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audit fees, and fees for non-audit services. This calls for log transformations. However, in order 
to gain a better understanding of audit and non-audit fees, we report those fees here in millions 
of euros, although log transformations are used in the regressions. Table 4 reveals that the non-
audit fees vary from zero up to 3.4 million euros. Comparing the median values of audit fees to 
total assets, we find that approximately 1 euro of audit fee is paid for every 1,000 euros of total 
assets. However, for the non-audit fees, the median value is much lower since it is about half 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
 Year Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
aU (million €) 2004 0.343 0.102 0.688 0.015 4.500
 2005 0.346 0.126 0.546 0.017 2.900
NaU (million €) 2004 0.175 0.064 0.319 0 1.633
 2005 0.207 0.059 0.457 0 3.400
TaU (million €) 2004 0.518 0.162 0.982 0.015 6.000
 2005 0.553 0.192 0.974 0.020 6.300
aDJ 2004–2005 0.501 0.528 0.217 0 1
SIze (million €) 2004 532.501 109.527 1048.97 4.792 6486.00
 2005 566.906 116.935 1080.83 5.240 6294.00
INvreC  2004 0.378 0.344 0.170 0.020 0.780
 2005 0.387 0.402 0.166 0.025 0.711
SUbS (#) 2004 26.055 12.000 32.369 2 189
 2005 26.534 12.000 33.255 1 189
roe 2004 0.114 0.138 0.219 –0.692 0.686
 2005 0.123 0.163 0.225 –0.869 0.556
Mb 2004 2.369 2.071 1.379 0.512 7.926
 2005 2.595 2.230 1.472 0.5054 8.727
br 2004 0.410 0.360 0.356 –0.174 1.399
 2005 0.447 0.384 0.328 –0.211 1.288
Flev 2004 0.124 0.207 0.148 0 0.563
 2005 0.212 0.211 0.154 0 0.619
Qr 2004 1.291 1.020 0.960 0.280 6.800
 2005 1.206 1.030 0.844 0.230 6.560
DISSUe 2004–2005 0.493 0 0.503 0 1
 2005–2006 0.493 0 0.503 0 1
PWC 2004 0.397 0 0.493 0 1
 2005 0.397 0 0.493 0 1
note: aU is the audit fees, NaU is the non-audit fees, TaU is the total audit fees (TaU = aU fees + NaU fees), 
aDJ is the adjustments comparability score, SIze is the total assets, INvreC is the ratio of the sum of 
inventories and accounts receivable to total assets, SUbS is the number of subsidiaries, rOe is return on 
equity, Mb is growth opportunities measured by the ratio of market value to book value of equity, br is the 
market risk measured by equity beta estimated by Sharpe’s (1964) market model using daily stock and 
OMX25 index returns over a one-year period before the end of the fiscal year, Flev is financial leverage 
measured by the debt to equity ratio, Qr is liquidity measured by quick ratio (ratio of current assets less 
inventories to current liabilities), DISSUe is an indicatory variable which has a value of 1 if the company 
has issued equity or long term debt in either the current year or subsequent fiscal year (zero otherwise), 
PWC is an indicatory variable which has a value of 1 when statutory auditing company is Pricewaterhousecoopers 
and zero otherwise.
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when compared to the audit fees. This suggests that provision of audit services may be a more 
important source of revenues for audit companies than provision of non-audit services. The fees 
also seem to be quite stable during the sample years. It should, however, be kept in mind that the 
composition of total audit fees (TAU= AU + NAU) can vary greatly depending on, among other 
things, the auditee’s structure. Categorically, income statement or balance sheet related issues 
may require more audit effort depending on the structure of a firm. 
Table 4 also indicates that the adjustments comparability score (ADJ) ranges from zero to 
one. A value of one indicates that there is at least one company in which the IFRS adjustments 
have been an extreme case (four times ninth decile) for every indicator. Also, in the other variables 
there is a considerably large variation, so the data should be highly suitable for our proposed 
research questions.
5.3 regression results
5.3.1 Estimation results for audit and non-audit fees 
The objective of our study is to analyse whether statutory auditors’ fees (audit fees, non-audit fees) 
are related to the magnitude of the IFRS adjustments of consolidated financial statements by using 
a sample of first-time IFRS users in an environment where the local GAAP (in this study Finnish 
accounting standards, FAS) deviates significantly from international accounting standards (IFRS). 
The mandatory transition from FAS to IFRS at the beginning of 2004 (transition date), stipulated 
by Regulation (1606/2002) of European Parliament and Council (2002), provides ideal conditions 
to analyse how this system-wide change affects audit and non-audit fees. In this section, the results 
based on audit and non-audit fees are presented. The robustness of the results is scrutinized by 
some sensitivity analyses which are provided at the end of the section.
Auditees’ categorization of audit fees11 can be somewhat arbitrarily, and also intentionally, 
misclassified as non-audit fees within the audit fees (e.g. Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997). AU 
items comprise of fees due to statutory audit and are therefore well-specified. With the NAU fee 
content there could be more variations. It should contain the non-audit service fees of the incum-
bent auditor. We admit that the true recognition of audit and non-audit fees, and how they are 
affected by regulatory change, is challenging.12 Furthermore, in disclosures the total audit fees 
(audit and non-audit fees) are typically fees caused by the auditor that issues the audit report. 
Services for other audit firms are not necessarily reported and separated in audit fees disclosures 
11 The fees paid to auditors are separated into audit and non-audit fees based on the auditee’s own declaration in 
the notes of the financial statements. Our enquiries for the local Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-FSA) and for 
the Central Chamber of Commerce were not successful in terms of receiving statistics covering audit and non-audit 
fees and their development. During the study we gained understanding that, at least, some audit firms analyze AU 
and NAU fees solely for their internal purposes (confidential data). 
12 An interview with a professional APA, (Pajamo 2009) Big 4 partner revealed that there are variations, though 
decreasingly so, how firms subject to audit register and disclose their auditing and non-auditing fees.
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(there are exceptions, e.g. Kesko Corporation reports both audit fees of the auditor and audit fees 
of other auditing firms). This can cause noise, at least in estimates in which fees are treated sepa-
rately. 
Another reason to aggregate audit fees and non-audit fees together comes from Elliot (SEC 
2000) who posited that non-audit services may actually support audit performance due to knowl-
edge obtained during the provision of such non-audit services. Thus, we first consider total fees 
paid to the auditors, i.e. summing audit and non-audit fees, take a logarithmic and run the regres-
sions. Table 5 presents the results gained from explaining the total fees paid to the statutory audit 
company by the complexity of the IFRS transition and control variables. The model is employed 
first by pooling the years together and then separately for each year. Before discussing the results, 
the potential multicollinearity between independent variables is considered using variance infla-
tion factors (VIF). Rawlings (1988, 277) suggests a variance inflation factor vIF > 10 as a guideline 
for serious multicollinearity. The vIFs of the variables in our regressions are clearly below that 
threshold value – the highest vIF is 3.06. In other words, multicollinearity, at least of the sort 
recognized by vIF, does not bias our results. 
Consistent with our predictions, the adjustments comparability score (ADJ) as a measure for 
transition complexity is positive. There are also indications that the parameter estimates deviate 
significantly from zero. When the pooled data is used, the significant (p<0.05) parameter estimate 
for ADJ is clearly resulted. This is in line with the view that total fees paid to the auditors increase 
as the complexity of the IFRS transition increases. Also, control variables, if significant, quite 
frequently provide estimates consistent with prior findings. Finally, the values of adjusted R2 vary 
from 78.5% to 80.9%. These values suggest that about 80% of the variability of the fees paid to 
statutory auditors is explained by the models presented here. The values are similar to those found 
in previous studies, which are typically in the range from 60% to 80% (Cobbin 2002, 72–74). The 
results seem to support the positive relation between the degree of IFRS adjustments and total 
fees. 
When separate regressions are run for each sample year the results are significant at the 5% 
level. Partitioning the data into years does not change the main, year-specific, conclusions mate-
rially. The coefficients for ADJ remain about the same but their significance levels are somewhat 
lower (still significant at the 5% level). There can be several reasons for this. For example, it is 
possible that partitioning the data into shorter periods can understate the association; the factors 
which determine fees associated with the IFRS transition can somewhat artificially be divided into 
years, causing non-contemporaneous fee/IFRS transition-association.13 This can increase noise in 
the estimates.
13 This is recognized also by interviewed APA auditor (Pajamo 2009). Especially non-audit fees could be clustered 
to a certain year.
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It is possible that IFRS adjustments cause uneven consequences for the pricing of auditing 
and non-audit services. Separate regression models (Eqs 6 and 7) are employed in order to focus 
more closely on whether the association between IFRS adjustments and the total audit fees results 
from audit services and/or non-audit services. Table 6 presents the results gained from explaining 
the audit fees and non-audit fees by the complexity of the IFRS transition and control variables.
Table 5. The regression results for total audit fees (TaU). 
(total audit fees (TaU) = audit fees (aU) + non-audit fees (NaU))
independent variable  expected sign Pooled data Year
   2004 2005
intercept  ? –11.357 –11.163 –10.901
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
aDJ + 0.543 0.532 0.619
  (0.0045) (0.0350) (0.0223)
ln (SIze) + 0.435 0.423 0.409
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
INvreC + 0.554 0.493 0.495
  (0.0325) (0.1314) (0.1170)
SQ(SUbS) + 0.194 0.213 0.178
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
roe − –0.686 –0.507 –0.864
  (0.0047) (0.1171) (0.0010)
Mb  + 0.075 0.061 0.084
  (0.0045) (0.0713) (0.0138)
br + 0.302 0.192 0.540
  (0.0186) (0.1730) (0.0068)
Flev  ? –0.598 –0.680 –0.402
  (0.0653) (0.1439) (0.4101)
Qr
 
−	 0.079 0.062 0.122
  (0.1184) (0.1332) (0.1198)
DISSUe + –0.063 0.020 –0.206
  (0.2443) (0.4441) (0.0506)
PWC + 0.255 0.265 0.241
  (0.0055) (0.0312) (0.0393)
f-value  55.89 24.94 28.63
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
adj. r2  0.806 0.7853 0.809
TaU = aU + NaU. the sample includes finnish listed companies which began using ifrS on a mandatory 
basis in 2005. the final sample consists of 146 observations from 73 companies. definitions for variables 
are provided in section 3 and in table 4. the notations below the regression coefficients in parentheses are 
based on the one-tailed p-values for signed predictions (two-tailed p-values otherwise) adjusted for an 
unknown type of heteroscedasticity using white (1980).
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Table 6. The regression results for each sample year.
independent  expected sign Model 6. dependent variable: Model 7. dependent variable: 
variable Model 6/ ln(aU)
 
ln(aU)
 
Model 7
 Year = 2004 Year = 2005 Year = 2004 Year = 2005
intercept ?/? –9.791 –11.116 –7.101 –5.393
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.3179) (0.4454)
in(NaU) ?/. 0.103 0.059  
  (0.0022) (0.0801)  
in(aU) ./?   1.164 0.768
    (0.0031) (0.0103)
aDJ +/+ -0.009 0.120 1.477 3.196
  (0.4889) (0.3549) (0.1525) (0.0191)
in(SIze) +/+ 0.358 0.413 0.319 0.212
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.1571) (0.2567)
INvreC +/+ 1.315 1.087 –3.140 –4.116
  (0.0014) (0.0094) (0.0313) (0.0137)
SQ(SUbS) +/+ 0.188 0.168 -0.082 0.095
  (0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.2141) (0.2541)
roe −/− –0.750 –0.518 0.343 –1.816
  (0.0250) (0.0896) (0.3569) (0.0509)
Mb +/+ 0.060 0.061 0.136 –0.154
  (0.1201) (0.0850) (0.1966) (0.2631)
br +/+ 0.113 0.111 –0.485 0.717
  (0.2943) (0.3182) (0.2179) (0.1274)
Flev +/− –0.575 0.393 –0.162 –4.150
  (0.0771) (0.2071) (0.4516) (0.0109)
Qr −/? –0.081 0.064 0.596 0.241
  (0.0589) (0.1861) (0.0140) (0.1374)
DISSUe ./+   0.622 0.441
    (0.0502) (0.1110)
PWC +/. 0.292 0.104  
  (0.0225) (0.2186)  
f-value  28.14 25.67 7.08 7.37
  (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
adj. r2  0.806 0.790 0.481 0.493
the sample includes finnish listed companies which began using ifrS on a mandatory basis in 2005. the 
final sample consists of 146 observations from 73 companies. definitions for variables are provided in 
section 3 and in table 4. the notations below the regression coefficients in parentheses are based on the 
one-tailed p-values for signed predictions (two-tailed p-values otherwise) adjusted for an unknown type of 
heteroscedasticity using white (1980). 
The analyses suggest that the association between non-audit fees and the measure for IFRS 
transition complexity (ADJ) is closer than that for audit fees, being significant for the year 2005. 
The result is to some extent consistent with the second hypothesis that there is a positive relation 
between non-audit fees and the magnitude of the IFRS adjustments. Auditors have consulted firms 
(NAU) during their transition to IFRS. In general, auditing firms are in a better position to special-
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ize on consulting, non-audit, services and follow their own, tailored, pricing principles in this 
category of assignments. These NAU fees reflect first time start-up and learning costs.14 It is likely 
that those NAU costs will decrease, even quickly, when the IFRS reporting is adequately mastered 
by the firm itself. 
The control variables, if significant, provide estimates fairly consistent with prior findings. 
The value of adjusted R2 varies from 48.1% to 80.6%. In previous studies the non-audit fees have 
been less frequently used as independent variables compared to the audit fees. However, the 
results are in line with Whisenant et al. (2003). 
Regarding the audit fees model (Model 6), ADJ does not gain statistical significance. The 
result is not consistent with the first hypothesis that there is a positive relation between audit fees 
and the degree of IFRS adjustments. This suggests that, based on the magnitude of the adjustments 
to consolidated financial statements, auditors do not charge higher audit fees during IFRS transi-
tion for the auditing of IFRS consolidated financial statements. In other words, auditors do not 
consider IFRS transition as causing significant changes to the components which determine their 
audit fees. This can be interpreted at least in three, complementary, ways. First, the risk that the 
IFRS financial statement is materially misstated is low. Second, knowledge spillover (or economic 
of scope) from non-audit services to auditing may exist. Third, tough competition prevented audit 
firms from translating audit-related IFRS transition costs into audit fees.15 
Overall the analyses suggest that the non-audit fees, but not audit fees, are affected by the 
magnitude of the IFRS adjustments. In these kinds of major change situations auditors’ involve-
ment is increased – to some extent even permanently due to the more demanding IFRS require-
ments. Higher total audit costs may moderate over time to the extent that they reflect start-up or 
learning costs (Griffin et al. 2009). We believe that our focus of only two years (transition year 
and adoption year) supports the recognition of the relationship between the degree of IFRS adjust-
ments and non-audit fees. Furthermore, it is likely that in our research setting, focusing on rapid 
transition (sample selection detailed in Table 1) from FAS to IFRS, non-audit fees capture start-up 
and learning costs. In line with that, it is likely that the increase in non-audit fees is mainly tran-
sitory in nature. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that during the FAS era there was a NAU 
type of consultation as well. 
14 For example, according the interviewed APA auditor (Pajamo 2009), during the transition the consulting costs 
for mark-to-market accounting are in NAU, but later, when accounting decisions have been established regarding 
mark-to-market, those costs will appear in AU.
15 This is supported also by discussions with professional, authorized, auditors (Fredriksson 2009; Pajamo 2009). 
At and after the introduction of new corporate governance code (Corporate governance recommendation for listed 
companies 2003) there was audit supply competition among audit firms. Corporate governance code launched 
audit committees. Those committees evaluated actively corporations’ audit function, especially auditing costs. APA 
proferssionals come to conclusion that auditing markets are highly competitive in Finland. Therefore core auditing 
services according the International Standards of Auditing (ISA) are likely to be fairly evenly priced throughout audit-
ing firms (section 4 presents the institutional auditing framework in details). 
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Regulatory and monitoring authorities should recognize the danger of decreased auditor 
independence in this kind of situation and, especially, establish ways to secure auditor independ-
ence. The strong role of audit committees supports this kind of development (Abbott et al. 2003; 
Miettinen 2008).
5.3.2 The robustness of the results 
The robustness of the results is examined in three ways. First, instead of removing possible outliers, 
scaled rank transformations (see e.g. Kane and Meade 1998) are also used for independent vari-
ables. This method solves a number of methodological problems potentially associated with the 
ratios. For example, it requires no subjective choices regarding outlier cut off and/or deletion. 
Also, the number of observations remains unchanged, which is important if sample size is rela-
tively small. The regression results after scaled rank transformation in independent variables re-
main qualitatively unaltered. 
Secondly, the Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity is performed. The reason for considering 
simultaneity is the possibility that the association between non-audit fees and audit fees can cause 
a simultaneous-equation bias in the estimates. The employed Hausman test for endogeneity is 
based on comparing the OLS and two-stage least-square regression (2SLS) estimators16. The test 
did not reveal any endogeneity; however, since the exogenous variables are almost the same in 
Models 6 and 7 (only the last variables are different), there is not much information available for 
testing the endogeneity. Therefore some caution must be exercised when inferences are made. 
Our third robustness check is related to our aggregate use of the adjustments comparability 
score metric (ADJ). As noted in section 3.1, our ADJ-metric assumes the IFRS adjustments have a 
multiplicative effect on fees paid to the statutory auditor. In addition to using one overall com-
bined measure of IFRS adjustments, we also analyze the potential differential effects of the dif-
ferent adjustments with the separate components of the overall ADJ comparability score metric. 
In practise, we run the regressions using four DCI scores (DCIEBIT, 
DCINI, 
DCIEQ and DCIDEBT) 
separately. In this way we should get insights into whether the effects of IFRS transitions are sig-
nificant individually and thus receive more information about the key IFRS effects on fees paid 
to auditors. The results (not tabulated) show, when the pooled sample is used, that, DCIEBIT, and 
DCIEQ are associated to total fees (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). When the model is employed sepa-
rately for each year, the same variables are at least marginally (p < 0.10) significant for either 2004 
or 2005. The analysis is also carried out using audit and non-audit fees as dependent variables. 
The results indicate that none of the DCI scores are significantly related to audit fees. However, 
every DCI score is at least marginally (p<0.10) significant related to non-audit fees for either 2004 
16 The basic code is http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/60372/HTML/default/etsug_model_sect050.
htm
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or 2005. This suggests that each of our IFRS adjustment measures is individually involved with 
non-audit fees to at least some extent. 
6. SuMMarY 
This study focuses on a major accounting transition (from local GAAP to IFRS) and how it is as-
sociated with audit and non-audit fees. The study assumes that IFRS introduction is a one-off event 
for firms and so it is likely that it affects considerably the preparation of financial statements and 
work of auditing companies. The Finnish data were used as prior research findings suggested large 
differences between Finnish accounting standards (FAS) and the IFRS. The analysis indicates that 
almost half of the companies have had equity-scaled changes in equity capital and debt of more 
than five percent, whereas in net income a somewhat lower frequency was reconciled.
Consistent with our predictions, the results indicate that IFRS adjustments, as a measure of 
the disparity between FAS and IFRS, positively and significantly affect total audit fees paid to 
statutory auditors. Consequently, companies whose IFRS adjustments for income statements and 
balance sheets are relative small exhibit lower IFRS-related fees than corresponding firms that 
have relatively large IFRS adjustments. The results support our presumption that increased client 
complexity and risk associated with IFRS transition are associated with higher fees. Furthermore, 
our analyses of audit and non-audit fees show that disparity between FAS and IFRS is more closely 
related to non-audit fees than to audit fees. In other words, transition costs are mainly non-audit 
type rather than audit type reflecting primarily IFRS start-up and learning costs. 
In general, this study adds to our knowledge on determination on audit and non-audit fees 
especially in a situation where audit risk and auditors’ workload change (move from local GAAP 
to IFRS). Further research can focus more on the separate non-audit fee items. This would be pos-
sible because nowadays the content of the non-audit fees is required to be disclosed in more 
details. Finally, our measure for the complexity of IFRS transition (ADJ) was based on income 
statement and balance sheet figures. Further research could pay more attention to increased 
disclosure information as well (an essential part in the transition from FAS to IFRS).
The transition to IFRS from local GAAP has touched thousands of firms worldwide. The 
growing acceptance of IFRS increases the likelihood of new IFRS transitions (see e.g. SEC 2007). 
Thus, it is likely that new countries and firms outside the EU will also adopt IFRS in the future. 
We believe that our research topic and its findings have long lasting relevance especially for in-
ternational readers, also creating potential large-scaled interest for auditing companies and their 
clients. Furthermore, country-specific mandatory transition to IFRS occurs only once. 
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